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consumption and heteroscedasticity. The estimation indicates that states with a
production capacity one barrel per person higher than the average state will have a beer
tax 20 cents per barrel lower than average. The paper provides evidence that the power
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I.  Introduction 
Excise taxes on sin goods such as cigarettes, liquor and beer have become more and 
more popular as a means both to reduce consumption of commodities that impose 
externalities on society and to generate government revenues. Alcohol consumption is a 
social concern because some individuals drink and drive automobiles. In 1996, for 
example, 17,126 people perished in crashes involving alcohol in the United States, 
equivalent to an average of one every 32 minutes. These deaths constituted 
approximately 41% of all 41,901 traffic fatalities in 1996 (National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (1997)). About 1,058,990 people were injured in alcohol-related 
crashes - an average of one person injured approximately every 30 seconds. About 
30,000 people a year will suffer permanent work-related disabilities due to alcohol 
(Miller et al. (1996)). However, the social cost of drinking and driving is not limited to 
the parties involved. In addition to loss of lives, injuries, and property damage incurred 
by individuals involved in alcohol related accidents, more resources have to be allocated 
for law enforcement, adjudication and insurance costs. In 1993, alcohol-related crashes 
were estimated to have cost society $45 billion (Miller et al. (1996)). Alcohol abuse, 
particularly by youth, is also closely linked to violent crimes. Cook and Moore (1994) 
find a significant relationship between per capita alcohol consumption and the rate of 2 
every violent crime except homicide, with elasticities of 0.6 for assault, 0.7 for rape, and 
0.9 for robbery. The ill effects of alcohol consumption also include an increased number 
of unwanted pregnancies and a higher incidence of cirrhosis of the liver. 
The argument that the user should pay for the negative externalities can be justified 
in terms of fairness and efficiency. The fairness argument has been suggested by 
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop (Center for Science in the Public Interest (1990)), who 
referred to the alcoholic excise tax as a "user fee". The fairness can be justified 
considering that the drinkers cause costs stemming from alcohol-related traffic accidents 
or crimes that are borne by innocent victims, boost costs of auto insurance and medical 
insurance, and claim a disproportionate share of government expenditures on medical 
care, long-term care, and criminal justice services. The efficiency argument is the notion 
of a Pigovian tax. Given negative externalities in consumption, some people will drink 
more than is efficient, since they ignore the external cost of alcohol consumption. The 
Pigovian tax has the effect of raising the price of alcohol to the level that reflects the 
social cost of an additional drink. 
On the other hand, persistent state and federal budget deficits have triggered a 
search for new ways of generating government revenue without increasing sales and 
income tax rates. As stated by Buchanan and Pauly (1970), excise taxes, by virtue of 
their narrow bases, provide perhaps the best opportunity for shifting the cost of the public 
sector on to a select group of individuals. From 1975 to 1995, tax revenues from 
alcoholic beverages have grown dramatically (shown in Figure 1). Excise taxes on 
alcoholic beverages generated $5.46 billion in tax revenue for federal government in Figure 1: Revenue from Taxes on Alcohol Beverages by Level of Government 4 
1975, remained the same until 1985 and increased by 41% to reach $7.70 billion by 1995. 
State and local government collected revenue of $8.71 billion and $1.17 million in 1995, 
climbing up 130% and 172% respectively from the 1975 levels.' 
The effectiveness of excise taxes on reducing consumption and raising tax revenues 
for government depends upon the tax rates and the demand elasticities. Currently, the 
excise tax on alcohol has two parts. The federal government charges taxes on various 
kinds of alcoholic beverages, which affect the alcohol consumption in all states. On the 
top of the federal excise tax, each state adds its own tax on alcoholic beverages. 
However, tax rates vary dramatically among states. Interestingly, there has been very 
little research on the determinants of these tax rate differences. To quote Hasen (1983): 
"Political scientists, despite their increasing interest in policy over the past 
twenty years, have focused on government spending and have ignored tax 
policy almost entirely. Economists have developed powerful analytical tools 
to examine the effects of taxes on the economy, but few have paid much 
attention to the origins of taxes or the political changes they impose." 
In this paper, we intend to fill this void, in part, through studying the significant 
variation in state excise tax rates in the U. S. beer industry. Our concerns are: What are 
the factors that are playing roles in the government's policy making process? Are the tax 
rates set at levels that are effective in adjusting the consumption to its socially optimal 
level? Does the variation in the state tax rates reflect the different abuse behavior across 
states?  In view of the similarity among consumption and production of most of the sin 
commodities, our research can be easily extended with small modifications to other 
I Adapted from "Public Revenues from Alcohol Beverages, 1995," Distilled Spirits Council of the United 
States. URL: http:// www .discus.health.org/govlev.htm. April 5, 1998. 5 
industries such as liquor, wine and cigarettes. It can also be applied to industries that are 
unfavorable to society in the sense that they impose unwelcome effects such as pollution. 6 
II.  Overview of Beer Industry 
Although the production of beer had reminded people of small-scale home brewing 
in its early ages, today, microbrewers aside, beer production in the United States is highly 
concentrated both geographically and industrially. During the last half of this century, 
the decline in the number of individual plants and independent companies in the brewing 
industry has been dramatic. In 1935, 750 brewing plants were operating in the United 
States. The number has fallen to a total of 58 in 1992. Along with the decline in the 
number of companies, an increasing share of the market is held by the largest brewers. In 
1947, the top five companies accounted for only 19 percent of the industry's barrelage; in 
1992 their share was 88 percent (Elzinga (1995)). Beer production is also centralized 
geographically. The states of Missouri, Wisconsin and Colorado, where the largest three 
breweries are located, account for 55% of the total beer production capacity in this 
country. Beer is an expensive product to ship. Breweries serve their distant customers at 
a significant transportation cost disadvantage. Although the large breweries are 
beginning to operate new plants closer to the new markets in order to extend their reach 
to serve wider geographic regions, currently the centralization is still notable. Prohibited 
by law from owning retail outlets, most brewers rely on independent distributors to 
channel their product to the consumers. Both a federal and a state-specific excise tax are 
charged on the consumption of beer. Federal tax, having remained at $9 per barrel from 
1951 to 1990, leaped to $18 per barrel in 1991. Each state is taxing beer consumption 7 
very differently. Figure 2 shows the variation of state excise taxes on beer in 1992. Tax 
rates ranged from $0.62 per barrel in Wyoming to $32.65 per barrel in Alabama, with a 
mean of $7.67 and standard deviation of $6.63. Figure 2: State Excise Taxes on Beer in 1992 
00 9 
III.  Literature Review 
There is considerable research on the effect of excise taxes on consumption. Lewit 
and Coate (1982) examine the potential for reducing cigarette smoking through increases 
in cigarette excise taxes by estimating the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes. They 
find that the adult price elasticity of demand for cigarettes is -0.42 and that the price 
operates primarily on the decision to smoke rather than via adjustments in the quantity of 
cigarettes smoked. Wasserman et al. (1991) estimate a generalized linear model to 
examine adult and teenage cigarette demand with a focus on the extent to which excise 
taxes and regulations restricting smoking in public places affect cigarette consumption. 
Their results indicate that the price elasticity of demand is unstable over time, ranging 
from 0.06 in 1970 to -0.23 in 1985. The teenage price elasticity does not differ 
statistically from the estimates for adults. Baltagi and Griffin (1995) estimate a dynamic 
demand model for liquor in the United States using panel data from 43 states over the 
period 1959-1982. The finding suggests that sin taxes raise revenues for government and 
reduce consumption. Heien and Pompelli (1989) present estimates of a demand system 
for beer, wine and spirits based on household-level survey data. Both the price elasticity 
of each beverage and the demographic effects on consumption have been examined. The 
results show that demand is inelastic for all classes of alcoholic beverage. Demographic 
effects play a significant role. 
Although there has been extensive research on the impact of excise taxes on 
consumption, there has been little work done on the determination of excise tax rates. On 
the theoretical side, research on the role of special interest groups from public choice may 10 
be useful in explaining excise tax rates. For example, Denzau and Munger (1986) 
suggest that the interest group can pay a bribe in order to seek a favorable policy move. 
Nevertheless, government officials are elected as a representative of their constituencies, 
therefore the unorganized and noncontributing voters can shape and constrain political 
decisions to a great extent. Fredriksson (1997) develops a positive theory to explain 
pollution tax policy outcomes in a small open economy. He finds that the political 
equilibrium tax rate on pollution is lower than the Pigovian rate. The result can be 
explained by the lobbying activity of the interest group and the relative weight given to 
social welfare by the politicians involved. 
Empirical work on the topic is even more rare. Benjamin and Dougan (1997) 
evaluate the cause of tax rate variation in the U. S. cigarette industry. They develop a 
model in which the producer location affects the level of excise taxes. The model 
predicts that taxes rise at decreasing rate as one moves outward from the point of 
production. The prediction is consistent with the observed pattern of cigarette taxes 
imposed by state governments in the United States. An important consequence of 
cigarette excise taxes is bootlegging, the smuggling of the cigarettes from a nearby state 
with a lower tax rate. Although the model provides some valuable insights into the tax 
determination issue, it can not be applied to the beer industry or other alcoholic beverage 
industries because bootlegging is not an important problem in the beer market in view of 
the difficulties with bulk transportation. Therefore, another approach is needed to explain 
the substantial variation of excise taxes on beer in the United States. 11 
IV.  Theoretical Model 
We look into the issue through two approaches. First, we assume that no influence 
of a politically active group exists in the tax determination process. The approach 
provides us information on the socially optimal tax rate. Second, the activity of a special 
interest group is added to the basic model. The approach identifies the effect of the 
interest group on the political equilibrium tax. 
We begin with a model of social welfare maximization. An ideal tax rate for a 
society is one that maximizes the aggregate utility of the society rather than a particular 
group. We assume that there are two types of commodities - beer (B) and a numeraire 
good (Z) that the consumers can choose from. All the individuals in the society can be 
categorized into beer drinkers (D), who extract positive utility from drinking beer, and 
non-drinkers (N), whose utilities are reduced by beer consumption. These utility 
reductions can be reflected in many ways in reality, such as death, injury or property 
damage from drunk driving, increased medical or auto insurance, and social problems 
such as homeless. The aggregate utility function for the society is written as consisting of 
the different utilities of the two categories of consumers. For simplicity, we focus solely 
on the utilities of consumers and leave out the producer side. This is justifiable for the 
current purpose of determining the optimal tax level, since this does not require 
identification of the tax incidence. The production side will be considered below. The 
social welfare function is represented as 
Up = Up (BD, ZD) + UN (BD, ZN) 
where Up represents the aggregate utility function for the society; I.J; is the utility 12 
function of a representative consumer in group i (i = D, N); Zi is the consumption of the 
numeraire good by individual i (i = D, N); and BD is the consumption of beer by the 
drinker. 
au
Furthermore, in the above social welfare function,  '  > 0 (i = D, N), which
az, 
means both groups draw positive utilities from consumption of the numeraire good. 
au,  a represents the marginal utility of individual i from beer drinking (i = D, N).  up
aBD  aBD 
au, > 0, which represents the enjoyment that the drinker gains from beer drinking.  <0, 
aBD 
which indicates utility cutback of the nondrinker due to the ill effects from drunk driving 
and alcohol-related health problems. 
The individual is seeking to maximize "private utility" subject to the budget 
constraint. When no excise tax is levied on beer consumption, the budget constraint for 
the beer drinker is: 
L D=PB BD ± PZ ZD 
where 1313 and Pz are the prices of beer and the numeraire good respectively. 
Optimization by the beer drinker yields the following first order condition: 
aUD _  pB  (1)
aBD 
where a is the individual's marginal utility of income. 
The utility function of nondrinker is negatively affected by the consumption of beer 
by the drinker, over whom he has no control. The optimization by the beer drinker does 
not result in the optimization of aggregate social welfare because he has no motive to 13 
take into account of the utility loss of nondrinker. Social welfare maximization requires 
the aggregate utility optimization subject to the budget constraint of the entire society: 
L = P B BD+ Pz (ZD + ZN) 
yields: 
aUD  a pa  aUN  (2) 
asp  asp 
Comparing equation (1) with (2) reveals that the beer drinker will drink more beer than is 
au socially optimal due to the negative effect on the nondrinker. Because  aUN  < 0,  D in 
aBD  asp 
BBD (1) is less than	  D in (2), meaning that BD in (1) is greater than BD in (2) (Assuming
aBD 
diminishing marginal utility). The drinker will not curb his consumption level when the 
consumption level reaches the condition in (2), but continue drinking until the condition 
in (1) is achieved. The social optimum can be reached with an excise tax on beer. The 
tax modifies the budget constraint of the drinker as: 
L D = (Pg+T ) BD  Pz ZD 
where T is the excise beer tax, represented as a fixed amount added to the retail unit price 
of beer. The optimization now yields: 
aUD  aPB+ aT 
aBD 
The optimization conditions for the social and private utility functions are the same when 
1 aUN
T * 
aBD 14 
Therefore, in the presence of the excise tax, the optimization behavior of the beer drinker 
yields the socially optimal result. The optimal tax rate is determined by the negative 
effect of drinking behavior incurred by the nondrinker. 
In this framework, the government is only interested in the public interest. The 
government imposes additional cost to the user, which would cause the consumption of 
the commodity to be cut back. The excise tax was first put forward lucidly in the 1920s 
by A. C. Pigou and is termed as Pigovian Tax. Pigou (1950) states that whenever 
marginal private and marginal social net products diverge, self-interest tends to bring 
about equality in the values of marginal private net products and equality in the values of 
marginal social net products is obstructed. The divergence can be mitigated by a 
judicious employment of taxes and sometimes by direct coercion. Therefore, the central 
issue for the regulators is to obtain sufficient empirical information so that the correct tax 
can be determined. The most dramatic improvement we make over previous research is 
that we study the influence of a special interest group on tax legislation. This area in 
taxation has not been sufficiently explored by either economists or political scientists. 
To model the special interest group demand for tax legislation, we assume that the 
group will participate in lobbying when the expected benefits exceed the costs of 
lobbying to change the beer tax. In the model, we add beer producers and assume that 
they are the only group who engages in lobbying activity. The organized interest group 
makes campaign contributions to the legislator in exchange for a favorable policy move. 
The amount of the contribution is dependent on the level of satisfaction the group obtains 
from the legislative decision. 15 
Although excise tax on beer is charged on retail consumption, not levied on the 
producers directly, a higher tax amount will boost the ultimate unit price that the 
consumers are facing and in turn reduce the quantity demanded. Because the demand for 
beer is not perfectly inelastic, the beer producers have to bear some portion of this tax 
burden. Thus, the producers benefit from lower excise taxes on beer. 
We do not explicitly include the lobbying activities of the consumers and retailers 
for several reasons. First, large numbers of consumers and retailers make the costs of 
lobbying exceed the small benefits gained from any individual lobbying activity. Second, 
theoretically, an association can be built up to act on behalf of any particular group of 
economic actors. However, the overhead will be high. Moreover, an important tool that 
is used by the lobbying group to connect with the legislator is the pecuniary contribution 
made to the legislator's election campaign. The fund raising among a large number of 
dispersing members can be an inefficient and complex task, especially when we consider 
the lobbying group organized among the consumers. The funds are mainly accumulated 
through relatively small amount of charitable donations. The inadequate resources may 
obstruct the ability of the group to affect the legislator. On the contrary, the beer industry 
is highly concentrated. Therefore, it is more likely that the beer producers will try to 
influence the political process that determines the excise tax on beer. The profits that the 
companies can earn as a result of a favorable tax move provide incentives as well as 
resources for such activities. We consider the lobbying power of producers as a relative 
power with regard to the groups of consumers and retailers. 
Because lobbying has been introduced to the model, the government is now 
considered to be an agent that not only cares about the welfare of the society, but is also 16 
concerned about the abundance of its campaign resources, which determines to a large 
extent its success in the reelection campaign. The government is willing to trade some 
extent of social welfare for the campaign resources that it can receive from the interest 
group. The weights that are put on these campaign resources relative to the social 
welfare vary across the legislation. 
In the discussion of lobbying activity, the inclusion of the producers as well as 
legislator into the social welfare function becomes crucial, because a payment transfer 
from the producers to the legislator is involved. Assuming for the moment that the 
legislator views social welfare as equally important as its campaign resources received, 
we write down the indirect social welfare function as 
W = Up + (Hp -np +np 
where W is the indirect aggregate utility function of the entire society; Up is the 
aggregate utility of the consumers, as before; lip is the profit maximization function of 
the producers in the beer industry; S2, is the campaign resources that are contributed to 
the legislator by the producers. Under this assumption, the lobbying activity only causes a 
transfer of resources from the producers to the legislator. The optimization of the 
aggregate social welfare function yields the same result as that of no lobbies: 
au, ±anp 
(3) 
where T* is the tax rate that maximizes the aggregate utility of the entire society, 
I oUN 
a aBD 
However, if the legislator puts more weight on campaign contributions than on firm 
profit, which is probable given that the success in election/reelection is the prerequisite 17 
for any political actions, the legislator maximizes a different welfare function: 
WL = Up + (Hp - ) + 6  = Up +  + (6-1) SIj, 
where WL is the utility function of the legislator; 6>1 is the parameter reflecting the 
attitude of legislator towards campaign contributions. The optimization of the legislator's 
utility function yields 
au,  an!' 
+  + (8  1)an  = 0 
aT aT  aT 
where T is the tax rate level decided by the legislator based on the maximization of his 
af2 own utility function. In the optimization condition,  P < 0, because the beer 
OT 
producers intend to reduce the excise tax on beer, the resources that are contributed to the 
government's election campaign will be enhanced as the policy outcome goes along with 
their expectation. Therefore, assuming (UA+IIp) is strictly concave in T, the government, 
for its own benefit, deviates from T* and sets tax rate at a lower level T, where 
auA  an 
+  P, > 0 .  Social welfare has not been maximized due to the demand of the 
aT  aT 
interest group and the government's public choice decision. And in this context, a higher 
tax rate would benefit the society as a whole. 18 
V.  Empirical Model 
The theoretical analysis presented above suggests several testable hypotheses. The 
model indicates that two forces influence the government's policy making process - social 
welfare maximization and campaign resources maximization with different weights put 
on each objective. The more weight is on the campaign resources objective, the greater 
the deviation of the final tax rate from its socially optimal rate. The ill effect of beer 
drinking behavior is the primary factor that the government takes into consideration in 
order to maximize the utility of the entire society. The more severe the damage to the 
society is, the larger the tax magnitude is required to reduce the consumption. Therefore, 
we define 
T* = f (GC) 
where 0 is the damage coefficient relating to beer consumption and C is the aggregate 
beer consumption. The more beer is consumed, the more serious the problem with drunk 
driving behavior, crimes associated with drinking, health injuries, and property damage. 
We assume 0 is constant across the states and use consumption quantity as a proxy for 
the externality, because people are affected by the ethanol content of beer in a similar 
manner. However, we have several concerns in this context. First, the distribution of this 
consumption will make a difference in the negative effect of consumption. Assuming 
that two states have equal per capita beer consumption, the bad consequences from it 
would be much less in a state with equally distributed beer consumption among all 
residents than a state with a portion of heavy drinkers and the rest being abstinent. The 
ethanol will not influence human behavior until the intake of it reaches a certain point. 19 
An equal distribution may result in a moderate amount of consumption for each 
individual and won't cause behavioral problems at all. But the heavy drinkers will be a 
source of danger and damage to the rest of the individuals. However, a measure of per 
capita consumption among drinkers rather than among the whole population in each state 
is unavailable. Therefore a proxy based on general alcohol consumption is used as the 
leading component in the government's decision. Second, the marginal damage may 
differ with the population density in the state. In a traffic crash associated with drunk 
driving, more people would be involved, die or be injured, if more cars and drivers are 
running on the road. But the population density can not be measured easily, because the 
population densities vary greatly in the metropolitan and rural areas within a state. 
The ability of the interest group to shift the tax magnitude in favor of itself is the 
main focus of this research. The interest group in our research, as explained above, is the 
beer producers. The beer producers make campaign contributions to the legislator with 
the amount varying with the satisfaction they receive from the legislator's policy. With 
this contribution of campaign resources, the interest group could form a coalition with the 
legislator to effectively enact a tax burden that is lighter than it ought to be for the sake of 
social welfare optimization. The benefits that two interest groups receive from an equal 
tax policy differ according to their bases that are subject to this policy. Beer excise tax is 
a unit price paid on top of the producer's price. The more beer the producers produce and 
supply the market, the more benefits will be received as a result of a successful move in 
the legislature. Consequently, there are more possibilities that the interest group would 20 
make efforts in the activities, such as lobbying, because benefits of doing so will be 
greater than costs incurred. We will use production volume to represent the influence 
that the interest group exerts on the legislature. 
Another factor that is essential in the whole policy making process is the weights 
deserved by the two objectives in each state. The nature of the state government plays a 
critical rule in this mechanism. There may be some conflicting forces that are working 
against each other underlying the process. The overall outcome depends on the 
comparative strength of each different force. The two factors determining the 
comparative strengths are the preferences of the voters in each state and the fiscal needs 
of the governments. The legislator, elected by the voters in the state, should be a good 
representative of the preferences of the voters. A legislator who is not working in 
accordance with the needs of voters could not have been elected in the first place. 
Moreover, for a legislator in power, this representation derives from the institutional 
requirement of periodic reelection. Denzau and Munger (1986) provide more detailed 
theoretical justification for this argument. 
We adopt religion as a proxy of the preferences of voters following Fuchs (1974). 
Fuchs argues in his book that the predominance of self-abstinent religion determines to a 
significant extent the residents' attitude towards sin commodities such as alcohol and 
tobacco. 
To evaluate the importance of interest group demand in the legislative process, we 
also use the financial needs of the government. A larger public sector requires more 
financial resources to maintain its functional operation. The interest group contributes 
campaign resources in exchange for a favorable policy. But a lower tax rate will result in 21 
the reduction of tax revenue assuming the marginal revenue with respect to tax rate is 
positive. The assumption is supported by Cook and Moore (1994), who argue that 
alcohol taxes are not high enough and additional public revenue can be obtained through 
increasing tax rates. Tax revenue is one of the major components of fiscal revenue. 
Therefore, the importance of tax revenue would rise when the government is 
experiencing an enormous amount of spending. The expenditure of the government will 
be used to capture this effect. As we expect a time lag in the government's adjustment, 
the expenditure in the previous year instead of the current one is employed. 
In summary of the above analysis, the empirical model that will be used in our 
estimation can be written as follows: 
T' = f (CONSUMP ,PROD, FUND, EXPEND _,) 
where T is the actual tax rate determined by both social welfare maximization and the 
campaign contribution process in each state; CONSUMP is the per capita consumption of 
beer in each state; PROD is the production volume by all the beer producers in each state; 
FUND is the percentage of fundamentalists in the population in each state; EXPEND_i is 
the state government's expenditure in the previous year. 
In studying the tax rate determination, we recognize the endogeneity of beer 
consumption in the determination of the tax and fix the problem by utilizing instrumental 
variables. Per capita consumption, as a proxy of the negative externality, plays a key role 
in determining tax rate. On the other hand, economists have been debating over the price 
elasticity of sin goods consumption to a great extent. Although there is not yet a 
consensus on the magnitude of this elasticity, most of the research has found a significant 
relationship between the price and consumption. As the tax serves as a major indicator of 22 
interstate differences in alcoholic beverage prices, the interaction between tax and 
consumption is not negligible. We construct an equation for the level of consumption, 
making it explicitly endogenous. We model the beer consumption as 
CONSUMP = f (PRICE, INCOME, Z.) 
where Z is a vector of variables that reflect demographic attributes of each state: religion, 
race, education, youth and state tourism index. This explicit inclusion of cross 
sectionally varying taste variables concurs with Baltagi and Griffin (1995), who estimate 
a dynamic demand model for liquor in the United States using panel data from 43 states 
over the period 1959-1982. We do not introduce a time-varying taste variable into our 
model, as they do, because we are studying a very short time frame, during which the 
taste can be viewed as constant. We do not treat the price of beer in a state as 
endogenous, because the producers charge similar prices nationwide. The variation of 
beer prices among states mostly reflects the differences in transportation costs and excise 
taxes. Each single state plays a relatively small role in the price setting behavior of 
producers based upon aggregate demand across country. Therefore, we view price as 
exogenous in the study of the demand function. The methodology is consistent with 
previous work on the consumption of sin goods. 
In summary, we'll estimate a system of equations that consists of a tax equation and 
a consumption equation. Taking into account of the interaction between tax and 
consumption in the studies of tax determination makes the paper more robust and 
justifiable. 23 
VI.  Data Selection 
Panel data of 50 states and Washington DC for 1992 and 1995 are used in the 
estimation. The 50 states and Washington DC provides a wide cross-sectional variation 
of tax rates. Data in 1995 is employed in order to have enough observations and thus 
ensure adequate degrees of freedom for the estimation of the system of equations. The 
data are extracted from various sources. Table 1 presents a description of statistical 
characteristics and definitions of the variables. These are discussed in more detail below. 
The real tax rates (TAX) for different years are employed in the model. The 
nominal tax rates in 1995 are converted into the real tax rates in 1992 dollars by deflating 
them with the ratio of Consumer Price Indexes for Major Expenditure Classes in 1992 
and 1995. The nominal tax rates and the Consumer Price Indexes are obtained from 
various issues of Brewery's Almanac and Statistical Abstract of the United States. Cook 
and Moore (1994) point out that the decline in the value of excise tax rates weakens its 
capability in deterring alcohol abuse and call for a dramatic increase in the excise tax 
rates. Using real tax rates, our model aims to explain the reasons underlying this decline 
in real tax rates overtime. 
The production volume in each state is expected to be negatively related to the tax 
rate due to the resources that the producers in the industry own and the lobbying activities 
they engage in to oppose the rising beer taxes. In our estimation, we employ the 
production capacity in a state instead of actual production volume, because the 
production volumes for some of the states are not available. Per capita beer production 
capacity (PRODPC) in each state is used to account for the difference in state size. 24 
Table 1
 
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
 
Variables  Means 
(Standard Deviations) 
TAX  7.35 
(6.31) 
CONSUMP  23.07 
(3.80) 
PRODPC  1.24 
(3.60) 
EXPPC  2.45 
(0.88) 
FUND  20.28 
(15.80) 
PRICE  3.9 
(0.34) 
INCOME  17.32 
(24.53) 
YOUTH  25.61 
(1.72) 
BLACK  10.95 
(12.11) 
TOURPC  0.32 
(0.76) 
EDU  76.22 
(5.56) 
DMW  0.24 
(0.43) 
DS  0.33 
(0.47) 
DNE  0.18 
(0.38) 
CONSUMP-1  23.38 
(3.75) 
POPDEN  350.55 
(1,303.19) 
Definitions 
Real state excise tax in 1992 dollars 
per 31-gallon barrel 
Per-capita gallons of beer consumption 
in a state 
Per-capita production capacity of beer 
in 31-gallon barrels in a state 
Per-capita state government expenditure in the 
preceding year in thousands of 1991dollars 
Percentage of fundamentalist adherent 
in the population in a state in 1990 
Real price in 1992 dollars of Miller Lite 
or Budweiser 6 pack, 12-oz containers. 
Per-capita income in thousands of 1992 
U. S. dollars 
Percentage of people aged between 18 
and 34 in the population in a state 
Percentage of black people in the 
population in a state 
Per capita receipts in thousands of dollars 
from hotel or other lodging places in a state 
Percentage of people with a high school 
diploma in the population in a state 
Midwest Region Dummy equals 1 for 
states in the region and 0 otherwise 
South Region Dummy equals 1 for 
states in the region and 0 otherwise 
Northeast Region Dummy equals 1 for 
states in the region and 0 otherwise 
Per-capita gallons of beer consumption 
in a state in the preceding year 
Population per square mile of land area 
in a state 25 
Benjamin and Dougan (1997), in their research on excise taxation in cigarettes industry, 
find a positive effect of production on tax. We prefer per capita production capacity to 
aggregate production level in the belief that the comparative importance of a particular 
industry in a state matters in deciding the lobbying power of this interest group. The 
production capacities of breweries are extracted fromBrewers' Digest.  A brewery needs 
to have a capacity of more than 60,000 barrels per year in order to be counted. We 
decide on a capacity of 60,000 barrels per year as the cutting point because the breweries 
with less capacities will be treated as micro breweries. Micro breweries account for a 
considerably small percentage of total beer production in the industry and are not subject 
to the excise tax policy we studied here. Therefore, this taxonomy is legitimate because a 
firm that enjoys no benefits and assumes no harm from a policy would have no motive to 
do anything with the policy. A brief look at the fundamental statistics of beer production 
capacity and excise tax rate in each state (shown in Table 2) supports our conjecture. In 
1992, the states with enormous production capacities, average 14.6 barrels per person, 
assume tax rates as low as $2.11 per barrel on average, relative to the cross-country 
average of $7.66 per barrel. 
The percentage of state residents who are Fundamentalist adherents (FUND) is 
constructed by using Brandley et al. (1992) and Smith (1990). Brandley et al. (1992) lists 
the percentages of the population adhering to specific churches and Smith (1990) 
identifies which Protestant denominations are Fundamentalist. Data are available for 
1990 only. Thus, the 1990 religion data are used for both the 1992 and 1995 
observations, and it is assumed that the religious composition of a state does not vary 
substantially over time. The percentage of state population who are Fundamentalists is Table 2: State Beer Production Capacities v.s. Excise Tax Rates in 1992 
States with Big  States with Small 
Production Capacity  Production Capacity 
Excise Tax  2.11  7.66 
($/barrel) 
Production 
Capacity  14.6  1.15 
(barrel/person) 
WI, MO, CO  NH, NC, MI, VA, NJ, 
TX, MN, GA, NY, OH, 
List of States  TN, WA, FL, CA, PA, 
IN, LA 
State with No 
Production Capacity 
8.22 
All States 
7.66 
0 
AK, AL, AR, AZ, CT, DE, 
HI, IA, BD, IL, KS, KY, 
MA, MD, DC, ME, MS, 
MT, ND, NE, NM, NV, 
OK, OR, RI, SC, SD, UT, 
VT, WV, WY 
1.27 27 
expected to exert a positive influence on the excise tax rate on beer. The decrees in the 
religion will give people more abstinence from alcoholism. Thus, the government, as a 
representative of the state residents, would have more strict control over drinking. 
The government's expenditure in the previous year is obtained through various 
issues of Statistical Abstract of the United States. A positive relationship between the 
government's expenditure and tax rate is expected, as tax revenue is an important source 
to finance the government's spending and keep fiscal account in balance. Again, we 
average the total government expenditure by the total population in each state to reflect 
the variation in state size. Per capita consumption in each state is used instead of the state 
aggregate consumption based on the same justification. 
To endogenize consumption, we collect data on the variables that may have 
influences on the demand. Beer price information, obtained from ACCRA Inner-City Cost 
of Living Index, is used to derive a measure for state beer prices for the years 1992 and 
1995. In each year, we take the average of the published beer prices in different cities 
and/or counties for all four quarters in order to purge the geographical variation and 
seasonality out of the price variable. We deflate the prices in year 1995 into 1992 dollars. 
The real incomes in 1992 dollars in the two years and a vector of demographic attributes 
are obtained from various issues of Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Demographic regressors used in the demand model include the percentage of the state 
population who are black (BLACK), the percentage of the population aged between 18 
and 34 (YOUTH), the percentage of the population who have graduated from high school 
(EDU), and the percentage of the population who are Fundamentalist adherents (FUND). 
As elucidated above in the tax equation, we expect the percentage of Fundamentalists in 28 
the population to be negatively correlated with the beer consumption. Beard et al. (1997) 
show a result conforming to our conjecture in their studies in beer consumption. In their 
studies of border-crossing sales of alcohol, the percentage of Fundamentalist Christian is 
employed. A negative influence of this variable on per capita beer sales, significant at 
1%, is found. The effect from BLACK is controversial in the previous studies. Heine 
and Pompelli (1989) suggest being black has a significant positive effect on beer 
consumption, whereas Beard et al. fail to find any significant effect from the percentage 
of African-Americans in the population. The percentage of youth in the population is 
defined differently from the previous beer consumption studies. Beard et al. (1997) use 
the percentage of people aged under 21 years old, whereas our YOUTH variable is 
defined as the percentage of population that are aged between 18 and 34. Advertising 
Age (1984) indicates that 61% of the 18-to-24-year-old and 58% 25-to-34-year-old 
population drink beer. The percentages of beer drinkers in other age ranges are 
substantially lower. The effect of education attainment in each state on per capita 
consumption is not clear to us. Per capita receipts from hotel rooms and other lodging 
places (TOURPC) is used as a tourism index. Tourists are more likely to drink beer for 
fun or relaxation. The prosperity of the tourism industry in a state should boost the beer 
consumption volume. 29 
VII.  Empirical Results 
Because the cross-state data are used in the research, we suspect that 
heteroskedasticity may be a problem inherent in the model. White's (1980) test is used to 
test for heteroskedasticity within the system of equations. The results indicate that the 
consumption equation has the problem of heteroskedasticity based on 5% significance 
level. Therefore, Instrumental Variables techniques (General Method of Moments and 
two Stage Least Squares) are employed in the estimation in order to deal with the 
endogenous beer consumption and correct the heteroskedasticity. The results in Column 
1 of Table 3 present the estimates for this model. We do not report information on R2 or 
Adjusted R2 in the table, because both statistics are poor measures of goodness-of-fit in 
instrumental variable models. (Greene (1997), pp. 508-509). 
Consumption indicates a positive but insignificant influence on the tax 
determination. The result does not seem to support our social welfare maximization 
argument, however it poses more concern about our assumption that damage coefficient 
of 0 is constant among states. We already stated our concerns in an earlier section of this 
paper - the quantity of consumption in a state, the distribution of the consumption and the 
population density in a state may matter in determining the externality of drinking. A 
preliminary investigation reinforces our suspicion. In 1996, Wyoming and New Mexico, 
where per capita beer consumption is among the top range, are associated with an about 
average or below-average mortality rate involved in drunk driving auto crashes, 42.4% 
and 34.7% respectively, relative to a national average of 40.9% ranging from 23.7% to 
53.4%. Also both states have very low population. Moreover, another explanation for 30 
Table 3 
The Determination of State Excise Taxes on Beer 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
GMM  GMM  2SLS  GMM  GMM 
Tax Equation 
INTERCEPT  -5.59  -5.43  -7.71  -5.90  -27.79 
CONSUMP 
(0.78) 
0.25 
(0.93) 
0.21 
(1.01) 
0.36 
(1.77) 
0.26 
(2.34)b 
1.08 
(0.89)  (0.91)  (1.21)  (1.99)b  (2.44)b 
PRODPC  -0.20  -0.19  -0.31  -0.25  -0.31 
(3.16)8  (3.47)8  (1.94)c  (4.51)a  (3.58)a
EXPPC  1.56  1.13 1.85	  1.67  1.63 
(2.68)a  (3.83)8  (1.69)c  (2.86)8  (2.73)8 
FUND  0.15  0.15  0.21  0.14  0.27 
(3.78)8  (4.38)8  (4.79)2  (3.57)8  (3.77)8 
POPDEN  0.0067 
(1.74)c 
Consumption Equation 
INTERCEPT  28.36  30.14  31.39  -4.30  29.19 
(3.60)8  (3.49)8  (1.99)b (4.25)8  (3.76)8
PRICE  -0.40  -0.29  -0.78  0.16  -0.03 
(0.54)  (0.27)  (0.81)  (0.82)  (0.04) 
INCOME	  -0.91  -0.97  -0.91  -0.13  -0.96 
(4.56)8  (5.94)8  (4.31)8  (2.20)b  (5.50)8 
FUND  -0.15  -0.18  -0.17  -0.01  -0.15 
(5.54)8  (6.78)8  (5.71)8  (1.08)  (5.27)8 
YOUTH  0.08  -0.04  0.04  0.04  -0.11 
(0.39)  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.82)  (0.60) 
BLACK  0.14  0.12  0.14  0.06  0.20 
(2.33)b  (1.89)c  (1.79)c (2.60)b  (4.14)8 
TOURPC  2.57  2.60  2.75 2.49	  0.01 
(15.94)8  (14.46)8  (4.68)8  (0.11)  (20.68)8 
EDU  0.14  0.17  0.14  0.07  0.18 
(1.63)  (1.60)  (1.68)c  (1.93)c  (2.46)b 
DMW  -0.88 
(1.14) 
DS  1.19 
(0.92) 
DNE  -1.14 
(0.78) 
CONSUMP-1  0.96 
(26.48)a 
Notes:  t statitistics in absolute values are reported in the parentheses. 
' significant at 1% sigificance level 
b significant at 5% sigificance level
 
significant at 10% sigificance level
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the insignificance is that high consumption occurs in the tourism prevalent states such as 
Nevada and Hawaii. In these cases, even if the consumption is a good indication of 
externalities, the externalities may be imposed, to a substantial extent, on the non­
residents, who do not have voices on the public policy making process. Thus, the 
government may put more weight on its need for campaign resources. Additionally, 
issues such as traffic regulations or other public regulations that help prevent drunk 
driving have to be looked into before any solid conclusion can be drawn. However, some 
of these effects may be picked up by the fundamentalist variable because of the 
correlation of different government policies. 
Production capacity of each state indicates a negative impact on the tax rate and the 
result is significant at 1%. If per capita beer production capacity increases by one barrel 
per person, it will drag down the tax in a state by 20 cents per barrel on average. This 
conforms to our public choice conjecture. The beer producers that have large capacities 
will consider it worthwhile to allocate resources for lobbying. Their benefits from a 
favorable policy change would be notable, whereas their costs to organize and launch the 
campaign would be relatively small due to their concentrated management and 
economies of scale. Therefore, the legislatures in the states that have large beer 
producers are more likely subject to the lobbying activities of the beer producers that 
attempt to hold back the tax rates. The results provide evidence that the current tax rates 
might be set at levels that deviate from their social optimum. There has long been a 
debate between policy researchers and industry economists on the magnitude of the 
existing tax rates. The policy researchers support that the current tax rates are too low to 32 
deter alcohol abuse, whereas the industry economists argue that the tax rates are set at 
their optimal levels. Our research joins the team of policy researchers and supports the 
viewpoint that the tax rates are not efficiently designed. 
The two variables that are used to explain the weights that the government assigned 
to each component in its policy making process, the percentage of fundamentalists in the 
population (FUND) and per capita government expenditure in the previous year 
(EXPPC), both meet our expectations. The percentage of fundamentalists in the 
population exerts a positive influence on tax rate. As a result of a 1% increase of 
fundamentalists in the population, the tax rate will rise by 15 cents per barrel. The result 
suggests that the local legislator reflects the preference of the constituency.  It also 
provides empirical support to Denzau and Munger (1986), who argue that the voters who 
have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized. 
The parameter estimate associated with per capita government expenditure shows a 
positive significant effect on the tax rate. An increase in government spending of $1000 
per capita corresponds to an increase in tax rate of $1.56 per barrel. 
The estimation of the consumption function of beer basically goes along with the 
previous work in the literature except the insignificance of the parameter associated with 
the price variable. Although a negative parameter estimate is obtained for beer price, the 
result is not statistically significant. It is not astonishing considering that only a two-year 
period is utilized in our estimation. A longer time horizon might be effective in capturing 
the significant effect of price on consumption. Some previous research has made such 
caveat as well. 33 
The estimation of the parameter associated with income indicates that beer is an 
inferior good. A $1000 increase in per capita disposable income in the state will reduce 
per capita consumption by 0.91 gallon. This conforms to the findings in Beard et al. 
(1997) and is not a surprise considering that beer has always been considered as the 
working class alcoholic beverage. Also as we expected, beer consumption is shunned by 
those identified as "Fundamentalists" and is popular with tourists. A 1% increase of 
fundamentalists in the population will results in 0.15 gallon reduction in per capita 
consumption. And a $1000 increase in per capita receipts from hotel or other lodging 
places in a state corresponds to 2.57 gallons increase in consumption. The positive 
significant effect of tourism on consumption may also offer some underpinnings for our 
hypothetical explanation for the insignificance of consumption on the tax rate. The 
results advocate that tourists play a significant role in the consumption in a state. 
However, tourists are not counted in the constituency, thus they have limited power in 
advancing their preferences and being represented by the local legislator. 
The percentage of black people in the population exerts a positive significant 
influence on the per capita consumption in the state. A 1% increase of African-American 
in the population is accompanied by an increase of 0.14 gallon in per capita consumption. 
This is consistent with Heine and Pompelli (1989), which suggests that black people 
drink more beer than the population as a whole. The impacts of YOUTH and EDU on 
beer consumption are both statistically insignificant in our model. There is no consensus 
on the effects from those variables either. Beard et al. (1997) employ the percentage of 
population under 21 years of age in their study of beer consumption. The result is positive 
and very insignificant. A variable to represent education attainment is used by Baltagi 34 
and Griffin (1995) in their estimation of liquor consumption, but a negative and 
insignificant parameter estimate is obtained. We need to look into the issues further 
before any solid conclusion can be made. 
To make our model more flexible, we try several additional specifications. 
Although we have included a vector of variables to represent the demographic 
characteristics in each state, chances are that we have not included a complete list of 
them. Therefore, we reestimate the model by adding some region dummy variables to 
capture the leftover effects. The result of this estimation is presented in Column 2 of 
Table 3. The region dummies are defined following the regions used by U.S. Bureau of 
the Census. Dummies for Midwest, South and Northeast are used while the one for West 
is left out. All the region dummies appear to be insignificant. Because no strong 
evidence of regional effects is found and none of the other estimates change dramatically, 
the model is not much of an improvement over the original one. 
We use the General Method of Moments in order to correct for heteroskedasticity in 
the cross-state data. We reestimate the model using two stage least squares to justify our 
selection of estimation technique. The estimation result is included in Column 3 of Table 
3. The values of parameter estimates do not vary substantially, but the t-statistics appear 
to be worsened to a noticeable extent. The EXPPC and PRODPC are no longer 
significant at even a 5% significance level. The General Method of Moments helps us 
gain more efficiency by correcting for heteroskedasticity. 
Because alcohol consumption is considered to be addictive, we reflect this in 
demand function by incorporating the consumption volume in the previous year into the 
model. The result from this model is reported in Column 4 in Table 3. The lagged 35 
consumption variable shows a very strong correlation with the current consumption level. 
But the inclusion of the lagged consumption weakens the effect of all the other variables. 
This is probably because the determination of lagged consumption is similar to the 
current one and the values of demand determining variables do not change much from 
one year to the next. The multicollinearity between the lagged variable and the demand 
determining variables might be brought in the model, a problem that might distort the 
individual parameter estimates and related t-statistics. The conspicuous result from this 
specification is that the impact of per capita consumption in the tax equation becomes 
significant. It provides some support to our social welfare maximization argument. 
Despite the limitations on this variable discussed in an earlier section, the result does 
offer some helpful insight into how to quantify the magnitude of negative externality of 
beer drinking. 
Lastly, as we discussed earlier in this section, the insignificance of per capita beer 
consumption as an indicator of externality may result from different damage coefficients 
(0) among states. We reestimate the model by including population per square mile 
(POPDEN) in the tax equation. We collect the data from various issues of Statistical 
Abstract of the United States. The estimation results are reported in Column 5 of Table 3. 
The parameter associated with per capita consumption goes up greatly to 1.08, and the 
result is significant at 5%. The population per square mile also shows a positive and 
significant influence on tax rate. If population per square mile increases by 100 persons, 
the tax rate will increase by 67 cents per barrel. However, in the consumption equation, 
the price coefficient slumps to -0.03 and is extremely insignificant. We realize that this 
population density measurement does not effectively reflect the difference in population 36 
distribution in metropolitan and rural areas, but the estimation results provide us 
important evidence on different 0 among states. More accurate measurement of these 
factors merits future consideration. 37 
VIII.  Conclusion 
This paper presents a model of the determination mechanism of excise tax rates. 
The agents in the model include the legislator, local residents and an interest group - beer 
producers. The interest group is assumed to contribute resources to the election 
campaign with the amount determined through their weighing of costs and benefits. The 
tax rate is determined by the legislator, who is seeking to maximize the combined utilities 
of aggregate social welfare and increasing campaign resources received. The research 
sheds some light on the complex institutions that determine our tax systems. 
First of all, although the paper does not provide solid empirical support for social 
welfare maximization because of the unavailability of appropriate data, it does support 
our conjecture that the comparative strength of beer producers can effectively exert an 
influence on the legislature and make the policy favorable to themselves. The analysis 
raises an important policy concern. The power of the interest groups hampers the 
economic efficiency of the local tax systems. A higher tax rate would be in the interest of 
the society as a whole. 
The second interesting finding from this research is that our empirical work shows 
that the local legislator reflects the taste of the constituency. This is inferred from the 
fact that a state with a higher proportion of fundamentalists has a higher tax rate. 
Therefore, the unorganized and noncontributing constituency may be represented even in 
a situation in which the interest group is well organized and active. This representation 
weakens the effectiveness of lobbying activity by the interest group and to some extent 
salvages the economic efficiency of the tax system. 38 
One important contribution of this research is that it endogenizes the externality in 
the model. The excise tax is initiated as a policy tool to curtail the consumption of sin 
goods that create negative externalities. Thus, the magnitude of this externality should be 
a critical consideration in the determination of the tax rate. However, if the policy 
actively serves its role as designed, the magnitude of externality should have been 
adjusted as a result of the implementation of the policy. The interaction between the tax 
rate and the externality is captured by making the externality (proxied by consumption) 
endogenous. 
In conclusion, the findings help us to understand the tax determination process and 
provide empirical evidence to the theoretical work laid down by early research on this 
issue. The paper points out that the influence of beer producers causes the tax rates to 
deviate from their socially optimal levels. The bias of the tax system depends on the 
production capacity that exists in the state. The research provides useful insight into the 
evaluation of the local tax system. 39 
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